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The question of how far and in what way to extend protection to witnesses 
in trials has manifested itself in institutions as diverse as the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECHR), the Committee of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the ad hoc criminal tribunals 
(International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone), and most 
recently the International Criminal Court (ICC). This is not surprising; as 
David Lusty has pointed out in his seminal analysis of the use of anonymous 
accusers, the question has arisen in almost every legal deliberative body for 
the past two thousand years.
1
  
The question poses a dilemma in the operation of the rule of law, since an 
accused has a well-established right to a fair trial. By almost any recorded 
standard, fairness is identical to the rights of due process, and those in turn 
have been elaborated in multiple fora. In the ICCPR, the right to examine or 
have examined the witnesses against oneself and to obtain their attendance 
and examination is a „minimum guarantee‟.2 Article 6(3)(d) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights defines as a „minimum right‟ the chance of an 
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accused to examine or have examined the witnesses against him‟ on the same 
terms as those laid out in the ICCPR. Article 21 of the Statute for the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
incorporates this minimum guarantee.
3
 So does that of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), though it allows under rule 69 (A) of 
its procedures for the protection of the identity of a witness in „exceptional 
circumstances‟.4 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
provides similarly for the rights of the accused in Articles 67.
5
  
Despite this impressive body of statutes and rules—and an equally 
impressive variety of cases which will be examined later in this article—the 
rights of the accused have frequently and extensively been qualified in 
international jurisprudence. This is because trials require witnesses. Witnesses 
of massacres, serious and traumatic crimes, mass rapes, or against vast 
criminal conspiracies often cannot be expected to come forth into the open. 
By doing so, in many cases, they would place their own psychological or 
physical health at risk, and may endanger themselves or their families.  
Witness protection has been a key concern of the international criminal 
system since the establishment of international criminal tribunals in the 
decade before the ICC. The ICTY and ICTR have incorporated in their 
statutes an explicit call for the protection of victims and witnesses, alongside 
respect for the rights of the accused.  Amongst the first decisions in 
Prosecutor v Tadić at the start of the Yugoslav trials, the ICTY emphasised 
that the obligation to protect witnesses represented recognition of the 
challenges at the time of operating during a conflict, without a witness 
protection programme.
6
 This necessitated the development of complex rules 
within the trial process.  
The ICTY subsequently established a witness protection programme, as 
did the other ad hoc tribunals.  The ICC also has a Victims and Witnesses 
Unit (VWU) concerned with protection, in addition to its court statute and 
rules. The Rome statute has the most extensive provision for the protection of 
victims and witnesses of all the international criminal tribunals.
7
 The VWU 
has been characterised as one whose resources could be very significantly 
stretched and therefore fall under pressure should the work required of the 
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ICC accelerate.
8
 Indeed, this pressure has resulted in a perceived tension 
between the unit and the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC, who in 2008 
were „unable to agree on the extent of their respective responsibilities for 
witnesses‟.9  
In the face of this, the ICC has adapted to what could be termed a 
„creative tension‟ within its founding Rome statute regarding the rights and 
protections of the accused on the one hand and victims and witnesses on the 
other. Specifically, Article 64(2) specifies that „the Trial Chamber shall 
ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and is conducted with full respect for 
the rights of the accused and due regard for the protection of victims and 
witnesses‟; Article 67 outlines the rights of the accused and Article 68 the 
protection of victims and witnesses.  The ICC has responded to this tension by 
considering the protection of witnesses through anonymity based on the 
circumstances before it in its expanding number of cases. This practice, as this 
article will show, can be considered at odds with other established 
international jurisprudence. 
At the time of writing, aspects of the protection of defendants and the 
question of the appropriate balance between the protection of the defendant, 
witness and victim, are in dispute between the English and Welsh Courts and 
the European Court of Human Rights.
10
  Given that the International Criminal 
Court, unlike the ad hoc tribunals, is permanent, the way in which this 
question plays out in the ICC is likely to be of even greater significance.  
This article will outline the protections offered to witnesses and victims 
by the ICC and the rights of the accused within that body. It will then focus 
upon the extension of anonymity to witnesses, and shall place those aspects 
within the international jurisprudence of witness protection generally. 
 
THE LEGACY OF THE ICTY AND ICTR 
 
Before the ICC came into existence in July 2002, a debate was ongoing on 
witness protection and the rights of the accused in the international criminal 
tribunals then in operation in Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone. In 
particular, Article 21(2) and Article 22, and Rule 69(A) of the ICTY statute 
and rules of procedure, and ICTY decisions related to these provisions, 
attracted attention. Article 21(2) rendered the accused‟s right to a fair trial 
subject to the need to protect witnesses and victims (Article 22). This included 
                                                     
8 International Bar Association Monitoring and Outreach programme Balancing 
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para 11, p 12. 
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„non-disclosure of the identity of a victim or witness who may be in danger or 
at risk until such person is brought under the protection of the Tribunal‟ (Rule 
69(A)). These combined provisions thus qualified the right of an accused to a 
„fair‟ trial by allowing for anonymity for victims and witnesses.  
The justification offered in Prosecutor v Tadic, one of the first and most 
important cases, was that the ICTY had an „affirmative obligation‟ to protect 
victims and witnesses, but that this could be done in the context of trial rules 
as much as in witness protection programmes.
11
  The principle of balancing 
interests thus began in the tribunals.
12
 It was initially grounded, however, on 
the basis that such a balance operated in „exceptional circumstances‟ (in the 
Tadic case, „in the context of the armed conflict and…terror and anguish‟ of 
the wars in former Yugoslavia‟).13 The Trial Chamber in Tadic laid out five 
criteria to apply in determining the applicability of anonymity:    
 
"[f]irst and foremost, there must be real fear for the safety of the 
witness or her or his family [...]. Secondly, the testimony of the 
particular witness must be important to the Prosecutor's case [...]. 
Thirdly, the Trial Chamber must be satisfied that there is no prima 
facie evidence that the witness is untrustworthy [...]. Fourthly, the 
ineffectiveness or non-existence of a witness protection programme is 
another point that has been considered in domestic law and has a 
considerable bearing on any decision to grant anonymity in this case 
[...]. Finally, any measures taken should be strictly necessary."
14
  
 
The International Criminal Tribunal in Rwanda, operating a year after the 
war there nevertheless applied the reasoning of the ICTY „mechanically‟.15 
However, both courts were ultimately self-limiting, and, after Tadic, the 
                                                     
11 Above n 6. The reason for the emphasis on rules in Tadic is perhaps explained by 
the way in which threats to the family of an alleged rape victim, leading to a 
reluctance of the victim to testify, caused charges to be withdrawn by the Prosecutor. 
A discussion of the point can be found in M P Scharf & A Kang “Errors and 
Missteps; Key Lessons The Iraqi Special Tribunal Can Learn From the ICTY, ICTR 
And SCSL” (2005) 38 Cornell International Law Journal 911-937, and also at S 
Suscinski Witness Protection (Memorandum from Case Western Reserve University 
School of Law International War Crimes Research Lab) to the Office of the 
Prosecutor 1 (Nov. 2002), www.law.case.edu/war-crimes-research-portal. 
12 N A Affolder “Tadic, the Anonymous Witness and the Sources of International 
Procedural Law” (1997-1998) 19 Michigan Journal of International Law 445. 
13 See C Chinkin “Due Process and Witness Anonymity” (1997) 91(1) The American 
Journal of International Law 75-9. 
14 Tadic, para 62-66. 
15 J Pozen “Justice Obscured: The Non-Disclosure of Witnesses‟ Identities in ICTR 
Trials” (2006) 38 NYUJ Int‟L L & Pol 281 at 282 
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ICTY did not extend unqualified anonymity again; nor did the granting of 
such anonymity become a feature of the ICTR jurisprudence.
16
 
 
WITNESS PROTECTION AT THE ICC  
 
The ICC represents a „step change‟ from the previous ad hoc and 
temporary tribunal system.  It is instead a permanent international court at the 
Hague, with expanded terms of reference and a founding statute which built 
upon but went beyond those of the ad hoc tribunals. As noted, it adopted the 
most extensive provision for the protection of victims and witnesses of all the 
international criminal tribunals.  
The growth of the ICC‟s remit and activities has been striking. Since July 
2002, when the Rome Statute entered into force, the ICC has conducted over 
twenty cases. At the time of writing, trials are ongoing or imminent in Sudan, 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, Uganda 
and Kenya. In addition, the Office of the Prosecutor has reported „preliminary 
examinations‟ in Afghanistan, Colombia, Côte d‟Ivoire, Georgia, Guinea and 
Palestine.
17
 For such states, witness protection is not only a costly exercise, 
but also often one that requires deeper bilateral exchanges and discussions 
amongst states than is extant.
18
 
Drawing in part upon the short history of international criminal tribunals, 
and upon its own jurisprudence, the ICC has evolved its own methods of 
witness protection which seek to balance the minimum rights of the accused 
against what may be termed the duty to witnesses, or their „due process‟ 
rights.
19
   
Colin T. McLaughlin has identified six ways in which witnesses can be 
legally protected by the Court.
 20
  These methods correspond with the 
following articles from the Rome Statute and rules from the ICC Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence:  
                                                     
16 Ibid at 291-294. The issue has, however, been discussed in other contexts since, 
see, for example, C Mahony The Justice Sector Afterthought; Witness Protection in 
Africa (Pretoria Institute for Security Studies 2010) which addresses anonymity in 
Kenya, Uganda, Sierra Leone and South Africa. 
17 Report of the International Criminal Court, Note by the Secretary-General to the 
General Assembly of the United Nations 19 August 2010 A/65/313. 
18 Ibid paras 4, 20 and 102. 
19 A Beltz “Prosecuting Rape in International Criminal Tribunals; the Need to Balance 
Victim‟s Rights with the Due Process Rights of the Accused” (2008) 23 St Johns 
Journal of Legal Commentary 167 at 183-4. 
20 C  T McClaughlin “Victim and Witness Measures of the International Criminal 
Court: A Comparative Analysis” (2007) 6 The Law and Practice of International 
Courts and Tribunals 189 at 190. 
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(i) non-disclosure of identity, associated with Rule 76(4) on pre-trial 
disclosure; 
(ii) protection from media and public photography, video and sketch, 
associated with Rule 87 (3) on protection measures;  
(iii) protection from confrontation with the accused, also covered by Rule 
87(3).  In particular, Rule 87(3)(c) allows for testimony to be presented by 
electronic or other special means; and Rule 87(3)(d) allows the use of a 
pseudonym; 
(iv) anonymity, while not directly discussed can be addressed by the same 
Rules above and by Articles 64(6)(e) and 68(1), which provide for the 
general protection of victims and witnesses;  
(v) reparations to victims, dealt with by Article 75; and  
(vi) protection for victims of sexual assault, comprehensively covered by 
Articles 68(1); Article 68(2), which provides for in camera proceedings for 
victims of sexual assault; and Article 43(6), which calls for staff within the 
VWU to be trained in dealing with trauma from sexual violence. These 
provisions are complemented by Rule 88, which gives a Chamber the 
power to order special measures on the basis that the witness or victim is a 
child, an elderly person, a victim of sexual violence, or simply 
traumatised.
21
 
 
Going beyond protection of victims and witnesses, the ICC is unique in its 
provision for the participation of victims in the trial process beyond the role of 
witness. This process is expected to contribute to expiation and recovery of 
victims. Article 68(3) states:  
 
Where the personal interests of the victims are affected, the Court 
shall permit their views and concerns to be presented and considered 
at stages of the proceedings determined to be appropriate by the Court 
and in a manner which is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the 
rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial.  
 
The ICC in Prosecutor v Lubanga has permitted victims to remain 
anonymous in their new participatory roles. The accused Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo was charged with using children as soldiers in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC). The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber allowed anonymous 
participation at the confirmation hearing, citing the deterioration of the safety 
                                                     
21 H Haider and T Welch “The Use of Protective Measures For Victims and Witnesses 
and the Balance of Competing Interests Under International Law: The Special Case of 
War Crimes Trials” (2010) 28 L’Observateur des Nations Unies Special Edition on 
“The Place of the Victim in International Law” 37-62. 
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situation in certain areas of the DRC which had undermined the ability to 
protect victims and witnesses living in these areas.
22
 The defence opposed 
such anonymity claiming that the accused should know who is bringing legal 
proceedings against him and seeking compensation.
23
 The Chamber attempted 
to strike some kind of balance by stating that anonymity would be granted at 
the expense of limiting the extent of participation. It stressed that :  
 
"[t]he fundamental principle prohibiting anonymous accusations 
would be violated [if victims] were permitted to add any point of fact 
or any evidence at all to the Prosecution's case file against Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo in the notification of charges document and the list of 
evidence".
24
 
 
The participation of anonymous victims was limited to accessing public 
documents and being present during public hearings. More controversially, 
their representatives were allowed to make opening and closing statements 
during the confirmation hearing and to intervene with the authorization of 
judge.
25
 The Chamber indicated that victims who consented to the disclosure 
of their identity to the defence could participate to a greater extent. The ICC 
has thus set out a principle that anonymity should not be viewed favourably 
but has not ruled out its use in particular circumstances.
26
 
The ICC trials in the DRC have proven particularly illuminating, in part 
because they represent the first workings of the court, and they have therefore 
produced many judgments on modalities and procedures. For example, the 
trials of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Germain Katanga, and Mathieu Ngudjolo 
Chui alone led to requests from over 400 victims to participate in the 
proceedings or to give evidence. Over 600 filings and decisions were 
                                                     
22 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Decision on the 
Arrangements for Participation of Victims a/0001/06, a/0002/06 and a/0003/06 at the 
Confirmation Hearing, 22 September 2006, ICC-01/04-01/06-462, in JOUET (M), 
"Reconciling the Conflict Rights of Victims and Defendants at the International 
Criminal Court" (2007) 26(2) Saint Louis University Public Law Review 264-265. 
23 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Defence Observations 
Relative to the Proceedings and Manner of Participation of Victims a/0001/06 to 
a/0003/06, 4 September 2006, ICC-01/04-01/06-379, in JOUET (M), ibid, 263. 
24 ICC, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, above n 24, 265.  
25 ICC, Prosecutor v Lubanga, Decisions on the Arrangement for Participation of 
Victims a/0001/06, a/0002/06 and a/0003/06 at the Confirmation Hearing, Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, 2 September 2006, ICC-01/04-01/062, cited in ZAPPALÀ (S), "The 
Rights of the Victims v The Rights of the Accused" (2010) 8(1) JICJ 150. 
26 See ZAPPALÀ (S), ibid, 151. 
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delivered. Many concerned anonymity.
27
 Of the rights of a victim or witness, 
those relating to anonymity have proven to be particularly complicated, and 
indeed controversial, especially once anonymity moves from victim 
participation to witness evidence. 
Controversy initially arose because the ICC appears to have moved away 
from previous practice in the ICTY concerning a hierarchy of rights. In the 
face of anonymity requests at the Tribunal, the rights of the accused to due 
process were considered a priority.  At the time of writing, the issue in the 
ICC remains unresolved.
28
  
The rules of the ICC make resolution difficult. Anonymity of witnesses is 
neither specifically granted nor specifically forbidden by the Rome Statute or 
the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence. This has allowed since Lubanga a 
creative tension to exist, wherein Articles 64(6)(e) and 68(1) are balanced 
with Article 67. Creative tension allows for discretion, but it also allows for 
inconsistent judgments, and opens the ICC to a kind of cultural blindness that 
may result in injustice. 
Criticisms of the discretion have tended to fall into two camps. The first 
represents a strain of „procedural‟ criticism. Writing specifically about 
criminal prosecution and sexual violence, Anne-Marie de Brouwer, for 
example, has suggested that the ICC should extend discussion of anonymity 
to defence advocates, and that it should draw on national traditions and the 
characteristics and circumstances of victims in general in making its 
decisions.
29
  
The second is a line of „substantive‟ or „culturally aware‟ criticism that 
draws upon the unfolding of the idea of anonymity as witness and victim 
protection in international jurisprudence generally. Critics have argued that 
anonymity cannot be reconciled with the right to a fair trial.
30
  Some have 
focused on the need to avoid blanket amnesty across tribunals. Joanna Pozen, 
for example, argues that minimum rights should be placed in context and 
„tailored‟.31In making specific recommendations for the ICC, Pozen suggests 
that anonymity should be factored through four filters.
32
 One is the existence 
                                                     
27 International Bar Association Monitoring and Outreach programme, Balancing 
Rights: The International Criminal Court at a Procedural Crossroads May 2008 9. 
28 W Schabas “Article 67 Rights of the Accused” in Triffterer (ed) Commentary on 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1999) 845-868, 867. 
29 A de Brouwer Supranational Criminal Prosecution of Sexual Violence; the ICC and 
the Practice of the ICTY and ICTR, (2005) 252-254. 
30 A Beltz “Prosecuting Rape in International Criminal Tribunals: The Need to 
Balance Victim's Rights with the Due Process Rights of the Accused” (2008) 23 St 
John's Journal of Legal Commentary 190. 
31 Above n 8. 
32 Pozen, “Justice Obscured…” above n 15, at 321-22. 
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of any ongoing conflict or war, and the existence of any viable witness 
protection programme. A second is the extent of any threat of bodily harm to 
witnesses. A third is the cultural issues and practices regarding identities of 
witnesses. A fourth relates to the cultural traditions that may influence the 
importance of cross-examination (eg conflating hearsay with firsthand 
experiences in Rwanda) and thus the acceptance of anonymity.  Amanda 
Beltz suggests that guidelines and a balancing test that considers both due 
process for the accused and protection of witnesses can ensure that witness 
anonymity is reserved for the „most egregious of cases‟. These are situations 
where a victim would be placed in „significant peril‟ in the absence of such 
protection.
33
 
The ICC is a young institution. Despite its unique mandate, it may be that 
the court can gain from an appreciation of other systems of witness protection, 
in other regimes. It is to those that we now turn. 
 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STANDARDS 
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS 
 
(i) The European Convention on Human Rights 
 
Article 6(3) ECHR provides that: 
 
“Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following 
minimum rights:  
 
(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain 
the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the 
same conditions as witnesses against him…”34 
 
As with the ICCPR, the right to confront witnesses under the ECHR is an 
important and indeed „minimum right‟. The significance of which was made 
clear by the Strasbourg Court in Kostovski v Netherlands
35
 which observed 
that: 
 
“If the defence is unaware of the identity of the person it seeks to 
question, it may be deprived of the very particulars enabling it to 
demonstrate that he or she is prejudiced, hostile or unreliable. 
Testimony or other declarations inculpating an accused may well be 
                                                     
33 Beltz, above n 33 at 200. 
34 Article 6(3)(d) European Convention on Human Rights.  
35 Kostovski v Netherlands (1990) 12 EHRR 434. 
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designedly untruthful or simply erroneous and the defence will 
scarcely be able to bring this to light if it lacks the information 
permitting it to test the author's reliability or cast doubt on his 
credibility.  The dangers inherent in such a situation are obvious”36 
 
Nevertheless, unlike the Human Rights Committee, the Strasbourg Court 
has recognised that there are exceptions.  In a number of cases the court has 
ruled that the constituent rights in Article 6 are not in themselves absolute.
37
  
The Court has accepted the need to strike a balance between competing 
interests of victims and witnesses and the accused. Where restrictive measures 
are to be applied, they must be „strictly necessary‟ to be permissible under 
Article 6.
38
  
The application of such exceptions, however, has been unsystematic. The 
Law Commission of England and Wales has observed that the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence is “difficult to predict with confidence”39. Nevertheless a review 
of the Strasbourg case law shows that the court has placed weight on the 
existence of counterbalancing measures which seek to ensure a fair trial. It 
will ultimately find a violation of Article 6(3)(d) though based on the extent to 
which a conviction is based on the evidence of anonymous witnesses.  
 
COUNTERBALANCING  
 
In various cases the Strasbourg Court has placed importance on 
counterbalancing measures. These are varied but include the opportunity of 
the defence and/or trial judge/magistrate to put questions to witnesses even if 
by proxy through a police officer.
40
 However the extent to which 
counterbalancing measures will prevent a violation of Article 6(3)(d) is 
unclear. In finding a violation of Article 6(3)(d) the court in Kostovski
41
 
placed weight on the lack of counterbalancing and in Van Mechelen v 
                                                     
36 Ibid at para 42. 
37 See for example Edwards v United Kingdom (1992) 15 EHRR 417, paras 33-34; 
Miailhe v France (No 2) (1996) 23 EHRR 491, para 43; Rowe and Davis v United 
Kingdom (2000) 30 EHRR 1, para 59. Adolf v Austria (1982) 4 EHRR 313, 324-325, 
para 36, where the Court, citing Guzzardi v Italy (1980) 3 EHRR 333, 361, para 88, 
and X v United Kingdom (1981) 4 EHRR 188, 202, para 41; Salabiaku v France 
(1988) 13 EHRR 379. 
38
 PS v Germany (2003) 36 E.H.R.R. 61; [2002] Criminal Law Review 312. 
39
 Law Commission No.245, Hearsay and Related Matters 1997 (Report No 245); 
available at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/lc245.pdf at para 5.1. 
40
 SN v Sweden (2004) 39. 
41
 Above n 20. 
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Netherlands
42
 the court observed that “Article 6(1) taken together with Article 
6(3)(d) requires that the handicaps under which the defence labours be 
sufficiently counterbalanced by the procedures followed by the judicial 
authorities.”43 In Kok v Netherlands44 the court observed that: 
 
“in assessing whether the procedures involved in the questioning of 
the anonymous witness were sufficient to counterbalance the 
difficulties caused to the defence due weight must be given to the 
above conclusion that the anonymous testimony was not in any 
respect decisive for the conviction of the applicant.”  
 
Similar statements have been made in Visser v Netherlands
45
 and in Lucà 
v Italy.
46
 In Doorson v Netherlands
47
 it was held that “even when 
‘counterbalancing‟ procedures are found to compensate sufficiently the 
handicaps under which the defence labours, a conviction should not be based 
either solely or to a decisive extent on anonymous statements”.48 This position 
is supported in the most recent Strasbourg ruling on Article 6(3)(d) of Al-
Khawaja and Tahery v United Kingdom.
49
 Here the court observed that: 
 
“while it is true that the Court has often examined whether the 
procedures followed in the domestic courts were such as to 
counterbalance the difficulties caused to the defence, this has been 
principally in cases of anonymous witnesses whose evidence has not 
been regarded as decisive and who have been subjected to an 
examination in some form or other.”50  
 
Arguably this settles the issue and counterbalancing measures will not 
prevent a violation, even, if as Doak and Huxley-Binns point out “a plethora 
of counterbalancing measures has been put in place”51. The real issue 
therefore is the extent to which a conviction is based on the evidence of 
anonymous witnesses. 
                                                     
42 Van Mechelen v Netherlands (1998) 25 E.H.R.R. 647. 
43 Ibid at para 54. 
44 Kok v The Netherlands (Application No 43149/98). 
45 Visser v The Netherlands at paras 45-46. 
46 Luca v Italy (2003) 36 EHRR 46 at para 40. 
47 Doorson v Netherlands (1996) 22 E.H.R.R. 330. 
48 Ibid at para 76. 
49 Al-Khawaja and Tahery v United Kingdom [2009] ECHR 26766/05 
50 Ibid at para 76. 
51 J Doak and R Huxley-Binns “Anonymous Witnesses in England and Wales: 
Charting a Course from Strasbourg?” (2009) 73(6) Journal of Criminal Law 508.   
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SOLELY OR TO A DECISIVE EXTENT  
 
The Strasbourg Court will evaluate the weight attached to evidence from 
anonymous witnesses. The most recent decision of Al-Khawaja and Tahery
52
 
has made clear that where a conviction is based solely or to a decisive extent 
on the evidence of anonymous witnesses, a violation will be found. A review 
of the Strasbourg jurisprudence taken as a whole however, reveals that there is 
little consistency on this issue.  
In Windsch v Austria
53
 the court found a violation of Article 6 where the 
applicant‟s conviction was based „to a large extent‟54 on statements made by 
anonymous witnesses to the police.  Here the court observed that “the right to 
a fair administration of justice hold so prominent in democratic society that it 
cannot be sacrificed.”55 In Unterpertinger v Austria56 the court found a 
violation of Article 6(3) where the applicant was convicted „mainly‟ on 
statements of witnesses who did not attend court.  This decision is difficult to 
reconcile with the later ruling in Artner v Austria:
57
 in both cases there were 
absent witnesses with corroborating medical evidence, but in Artner no 
violation was found. Three dissenting judges in Artner viewed the cases as 
indistinguishable.
58
 
The term solely or to a decisive extent appears to have been first used in 
Doorson
59
 and then referred to in Luca
60
 where the court held that “where a 
conviction is based solely or to a decisive extent
61
 on depositions that have 
been made by a person whom the accused has had no opportunity to examine 
or to have examined, whether during the investigation or at the trial, the rights 
of the defence are restricted to an extent that is incompatible with the 
guarantees provided by Art.6.”62  Similar dicta can also be found in the 
Kostovski
63
 decision.  
                                                     
52 Above n 34. 
53 Windisch v Austria (1991) 13 E.H.R.R. 281. 
54 Ibid at para 31. 
55 Ibid at para 30. 
56 Unterpertinger v Austria (1991) 13 E.H.R.R. 175. 
57 Artner v Austria (1992) Series A No.342. 
58 Ibid. The decision was based on a five to four vote and provoked a strong dissent.  
See Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Walsh, Macdonald and Palm who held that 
without the use of the statements no conviction could have been obtained. 
59 See R v Horncastle  [2009] EWCA Crim 964 at para 44. 
60 Above n 31. 
61 Emphasis added. 
62 Above n 31 at H 8 (d). 
63 Above n 20 at para 44. 
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It is confusing though that while the words „to a large extent‟ and „mainly‟ 
were used in Windsch
64
 and Unterpertinger
65
, Luca
66
 and Kostovski
67
 use 
„solely or to a decisive degree‟. However, in Ludi v Switzerland68 it was 
enough that the evidence „played a part‟ in the conviction.69  In Krasniki v 
Czech Republic
70
 a conviction based solely on the evidence of anonymous 
witnesses was not considered unsafe, but the court held that the need for 
anonymity must be clearly established.   
Nevertheless in Al-Khawaja and Tahery
71
 the court found a violation 
where the applicant‟s convictions were based on the hearsay evidence of 
witnesses unable to testify at trial. The court found that Article 6(3)(d) “in 
principle required that all evidence had to be produced in the presence of the 
accused at a public hearing with a view to adversarial argument.”72 Luca was 
referred to and the solely/decisive rule maintained. There is academic opinion 
arguing that Al-Khawaja and Tahery leaves the Strasbourg position on 
anonymous witnesses “relatively clear”.73 However the United Kingdom 
Government has referred the decision to the Grand Chamber at Strasbourg 
and the UK Supreme Court has „squared up‟ to Strasbourg74 on the issue in R 
v Horncastle.
75
 Here Lord Phillips was highly critical of the Strasbourg 
Court‟s approach to making exceptions to the Article 6(3)(d) principle which 
he observed “has resulted in a jurisprudence that lacks clarity”.76 
Questions have also been raised in respect of the meaning of decisive. In 
Van Mechelen Judge van Dijk argued, dissenting, that the solely or decisive 
extent test “is difficult to apply, because if the testimony of anonymous 
witnesses is used by the court as part of the evidence, that will always be 
because the court considers it a “decisive” part of that evidence, making the 
proof complete or at least sufficient.”77 This view is shared by Lord Phillips 
who in Horncastle argued that a strict adherence to the solely/decisive test 
                                                     
64 Windisch v Austria (1991) 13 E.H.R.R. 281. 
65 Above n 41. 
66 Luca v Italy (2003) 36 EHRR 46. 
67 Above n 20 at para 44. 
68
 Ludi v Switzerland (1993) 15 E.H.R.R. 173. 
69 
 W O‟Brian “The Right of Confrontation: US and European Perspectives” (2005) 
121 Law Quarterly Rev 481. 
70
 Krasniki v Czech Republic (Application No. 51277/99). 
71
 Above n 34. 
72
 Ibid at para H3. 
73
 J Doak  and R Huxley-Binns R above n 51. 
74
 See J R Spencer “Squaring up to Strasbourg: Horncastle in the Supreme Court” 
Archbold Review 2010. 
75 R v Horncastle  [2009] EWCA Crim 964. 
76 Ibid at para 14. 
77 Above n 27 at para 88. 
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could result in injustice: “it will in some cases result in the acquittal, or failure 
to prosecute, defendants where there is cogent evidence of their guilt. This 
will be to the detriment of their victims and will result in defendants being left 
free to add to the number of those victims.”78  
It would seem on balance that the solely/decisive test is the current 
Strasbourg position. But the law is far from being settled. At the time of 
writing
79
 the Al-Khawaja and Tahery case is days away from being heard by 
the Grand Chamber and the problems with the test remain.  
 
RIGHTS OF WITNESSES/VICTIMS 
 
An important issue, to which the Strasbourg authorities will have regard 
when assessing the permissibility of witness anonymity, is the Convention 
rights of the witnesses themselves.
80
 Articles 2 and 8 ECHR mirror Articles 6 
and 17 ICCPR providing protection for the right to life
81
 and for private and 
family life.
82
 In Doorson the court found there was sufficient reason to 
maintain the anonymity of drug addicts giving evidence against drug dealers 
and reasoned that “drug dealers frequently resorted to threats and actual 
violence against persons who gave evidence against them”.83 Significantly the 
court observed that: 
 
“It is true that Article 6 does not explicitly require the interests of 
witnesses in general, and those of victims called upon to testify in 
particular, to be taken into consideration. However, their life, liberty 
or security of person may be at stake, as may interests coming 
generally within the ambit of Article 8 of the Convention. Such 
interests of witnesses and victims are in principle protected by other, 
substantive provisions of the Convention, which imply that 
Contracting States should organise their criminal proceedings in such 
a way that those interests are not unjustifiably imperilled. Against this 
background, principles of fair trial also require that in appropriate 
                                                     
78 Above n 60 at para 105. 
79
 Al-Khawaja and Tahery v United Kingdom (nos. 26766/05 and 22228/06).   
80
 Article 2 ECHR provides “Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one 
shall be deprived of his life…” and Article 8 ECHR provides “Everyone has the right 
to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.” 
81 Article 2(1) “Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law...” 
82 Article 8(1) “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence...” 
83 Above n 32 at para 71. 
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cases the interests of the defence are balanced against those of 
witnesses or victims called upon to testify.”84 
 
In the later case of Van Mechelen the court recognised that there can be 
special categories of witnesses and the “balancing of the interests of the 
defence against arguments in favour of maintaining the anonymity of the 
witnesses raises special problems if the witnesses in question are members of 
the police force of the state.”85 Such witnesses interest in remaining 
anonymous is the court held “to some extent different from that of 
disinterested witnesses or victims.”86 Particular regard was given to the 
preservation of undercover agents and protection of their families.
87
 
 
(ii) The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  
 
Article 14(3) ICCPR provides that: 
 
“In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone 
shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees...  
 
(e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to 
obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf 
under the same conditions as witnesses against him.”  
 
The rights set out in the Covenant are „minimum guarantees‟ and are 
formulated without restriction.
88
 State Parties are obligated to „respect and to 
ensure‟ the rights of individuals within their jurisdiction.89 The decisions and 
resolutions of the Human Rights Committee (“The Committee”) are 
“authoritative interpretation” and are not binding on States.90  
 
The Committee has been reasonably uncompromising in its application of 
Article 14(3)(e). In Peart v Jamaica
91
 a violation was found where the police 
failed to make a prosecution witness‟ police statement available to the 
                                                     
84 Above n 27 at para 70. 
85 Ibid at para 2. 
86 Ibid at para 56. 
87 Ibid.  
88 M Nowak (1993) UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary 
(2005 ed) 342. 
89 Pursuant to Article 2 ICCPR. 
90 Above n 4 at para 21. 
91 Peart v Jamaica Communication No 464/1991 and 482/1991. 
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defence. This, the Committee held, “obstructed the defence in its cross-
examination of the witness”.92 In Espinoza de Polay the Committee found that 
trials involving „faceless judges‟ were a violation of Article 14(3).93 
Violations have also been found in relation to the withholding of the names of 
witnesses from the defence in drug trafficking trials in Columbia.
94
 
The Committee will not find a violation of Article 14(3) where the 
defendant has waived his rights to confrontation. In Adams v Jamaica
95
 the 
police denied the defendant the opportunity to cross-examine prosecution 
witnesses. However the Committee noted that “even though counsel objected 
to its submission into evidence, from the record it appears that he did not 
request an adjournment or even ask for a copy of the statement.”96 No 
violation of Article 13(3)(e) was found. Similar dicta can be found in 
Compass v Jamaica.
97
  
The Committee also does not appear to have formulated any exceptions to 
the right to confront witnesses, as the Strasbourg has.  
 
THE RIGHTS OF WITNESSES/VICTIMS 
 
The rights of witnesses/victims will be balanced by the Committee, 
against the rights of the defence when finding a violation of Article 14(3). 
Articles 6 and 17 of the Covenant provide for the right to life
98
 and protection 
of privacy
99
 respectively. Arguably these rights offer protection to witnesses 
giving evidence before courts and tribunals. State Parties have an obligation 
in accordance in Article 2 to “respect and to ensure to all individuals”100 the 
rights set out in the Covenant. This includes taking “the necessary steps...to 
                                                     
92 Ibid at para 13. 
93 Communication No. 577/1994: Peru. 09/01/1998. 
U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/61/D/577/1994.  
94 Concluding Observations by the Human Rights Committee 
U.N.Doc.CCPR/C/79/Add.75, 9 April 1997 paras 21-40. 
95 Michael Adams v. Jamaica, Communication No. 607/1994, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/58/D/607/1994 (1996). 
96 Ibid at para 8.3. 
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CCPR/C/49/D/375/1989 (1993). 
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100 
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adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the 
rights recognized.”101  
The rights of witnesses/victims giving evidence in court are also protected 
by the UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and 
Abuse of Power. Article 6 provides that: “The responsiveness of judicial and 
administrative processes to the needs of victims should be facilitated by:  (b) 
Allowing the views and concerns of victims to be presented and considered at 
appropriate stages of the proceedings where their personal interests are 
affected, without prejudice to the accused and consistent with the relevant 
national criminal justice system”.102 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
The protection of witnesses is a complex and important issue that 
demands an integral balancing act against the rights of the accused.  
An individual that find themselves facing an international trial at the ICC 
is guaranteed the right to a fair trial in accordance with international human 
rights standards as prescribed by international instruments such as the ICCPR 
and the ECHR. The Rome Statute of the ICC explicitly states in Article 21(3) 
that the Court must interpret law in accordance with “internationally 
recognized human rights”. The credibility and legitimacy of the ICC will 
depend on how far the Court is able to fulfil these guarantees. 
The requirements of a fair trial generally include a public hearing in 
which the accused has an opportunity to examine witnesses against him or 
her. Nevertheless, the right of the accused to know and to confront 
prosecution witnesses is not absolute and must be balanced against other 
interests. The judges at the ICC will have to be proactive in order to the 
balance the right of the accused against the protection of victims and 
witnesses. The judges will have to carefully give appropriate weight to both 
sets of interests and not shift the balance too far either side. This is a difficult 
task. 
The day to day interpretation and practice of the ICC over the issue of 
witness anonymity will be littered with challenges. As well as looking to the 
practice of other tribunals such as the ICTY and the ICTR, which will no 
doubt be useful and instructive, the ICC can forge and build on the 
shortcomings from such Tribunals. In addition, another source of informative 
and guidance on the issue of witness anonymity can be found in the realms of 
international human rights law in particular the ECHR where the scope of 
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witness anonymity has come under the purview of the Chambers in 
Strasbourg. Yet, the Strasbourg jurisprudence is not without its problems. 
Many of the difficulties identified above relating to the use of 
counterbalancing measures to mitigate a potential violation and the test for 
determining the scope of witness anonymity are not without their own 
problems. The case of Al-Khawaja and Tahery may shed further light on the 
application of the solely/decisive test used in relation to witness anonymity.  
The decision of the Grand Chamber at Strasbourg on this case will not only be 
useful to national courts but will also be of value to the ICC when confronted 
with the issue. But what is clear is that the discussion of the issue of witness 
anonymity by the Strasbourg court demonstrates the tension faced by courts 
generally in dealing with the matter and balancing the protection of witnesses 
and the rights of the accused.   
As former ICTY judge Patricia Wald commented, „witnesses in war 
crimes tribunal proceedings are precious commodities‟ and accordingly have 
to treated with respect and dignity. The use of protective measures such as 
anonymity is one of a number of means by which the ICC will be able to fulfil 
its obligation under Article 68 of the Rome Statute to take „appropriate 
measures to protect the safety, physical and psychological well-being, dignity 
and privacy of victims and witnesses.‟ But so too the defendants must be 
afforded their basic rights and given a fair trial, in respect of which 
confrontation is an important aspect. Ultimately, it will fall to the judges at the 
ICC to determine the correct balance between fair trial rights of the accused 
and the protection of witnesses. 
 
